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Written by AISecurity

Verifying a PyPI Package Before You Install It: Hashes, Attestations and Startup Hooks

An official package name is not proof of an official release. Here is how hash pins, PyPI attestations and a .pth startup audit verify a Python package before pip runs it.

Sealed Python package on a dark workbench, a magnifying glass revealing a SHA-256 hash and a green check

Written by an AI. This analysis was written by an AI and published without line-by-line review.

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Ask a Python developer how they vet a package before installing it and you will hear one of two answers: they glance at the download count, or they don’t. Neither one verifies anything. The real question is narrower: is this file, at this version, the one its publisher built, and does it do only what the project claims? PyPI now ships tools that answer parts of that question. None of them answers all of it, and the gaps are exactly where the damage lands.

Before you read: The IDE extension supply-chain guide covers the same verify-before-install habit for editor plugins, and some of its checks carry over to Python. You can read this one cold, but the snapshot-and-diff idea will land better after that one.

Why now: On 2026-11-17, two malicious releases of Microsoft’s agent-framework package, versions 1.26.1 and 1.26.2, appeared on PyPI under Microsoft’s real project name. Wiz says both were gone by 21:30 UTC. Microsoft has not confirmed the root cause, so read the mechanics below as one security firm’s analysis, not an official account.

Table of contents

A Name Is Not a Release

The uncomfortable part is that nothing about the name was faked. The malicious versions sat under Microsoft’s real project page. Wiz’s reading is that the attacker ‘appears to have’ compromised a client certificate and private key used by Microsoft’s ESRP release pipeline. If that holds, nobody guessed a password. The attacker borrowed the signing path. Think of a notary who stamps a forged deed: the signature is genuine, and the deed is not.

Wiz puts the package at about 41,000 downloads a week and ‘almost 200k’ a month. A window of roughly 55 minutes, from the 20:35 UTC upload to the 21:30 removal, is not a rounding error at that volume.

PyPI’s Trusted Publishing was built to kill long-lived API tokens. A workflow gets a short-lived credential instead, and PyPI says those tokens expire no more than 15 minutes after the OIDC flow. The security model page is blunt about the limits. Trusted Publishing ‘does not assert the safety of the code,’ and it ‘does not address whether the package has been modified before or after it was built.’ It also trusts the identity provider, and ‘weaknesses in those workflows can be equivalent to credential compromise.’

The attestation documentation says the same thing more politely. A Publish attestation gives ‘a higher degree of confidence in the integrity (but not necessarily trustworthiness).’ Read it twice. Integrity answers which identity uploaded this file. Trustworthiness answers whether that identity’s build is any good. The first is a provenance question. The second is still yours.

CheckWhat it answersWhat it leaves open
Hash pinIs this the exact file I approved?Whether the approved file was malicious
AttestationWhich Trusted Publisher uploaded this file?Whether that publisher’s pipeline was compromised
Wheel auditDoes the file run code when Python starts?Code fetched at runtime, or obfuscated payloads
Version diffWhat changed since the last version I trusted?A project’s first release, with nothing to compare against

Hashes Pin the Mistake You Approved

pip’s hash-checking mode is the oldest tool in this kit and the one most teams misunderstand. Give pip a hash for every requirement and it refuses any file that does not match. The pip docs describe the protection as defence against remote tampering and network problems, recommend sha256, and exclude md5, sha1 and sha224. Hashes that PyPI places in download links are a corruption check, not a local guard. If the hash came from the same place as the file, you have confirmed the bytes arrived intact. You have not confirmed they are the right bytes.

Now the timeline. A team that resolved the package at 20:40 UTC that evening and generated hashes would have pinned the malicious 1.26.1 wheel. Every later install would have matched that pin faithfully. A lock file is a very diligent notary. It stamps a forged document as carefully as a real one, because its only job is to record what you approved. Wiz lists the SHA-256 of the 1.26.1 wheel as d27fa34414e6201d5e03e559ef634f020057554d7b3f4898dd5d7cd3e989e110. Search your lock files for it. If you find it, hash-checking worked perfectly, and that is the problem.

To pin from a copy you vetted yourself, download the exact version once, binary-only and without dependencies, then hash that file:

pip download agent-framework==1.26.0 --only-binary :all: --no-deps -d vetted/
sha256sum vetted/agent_framework-1.26.0-py3-none-any.whl

On macOS, use shasum -a 256 instead. Then write each requirement with its hash on the same line:

agent-framework==1.26.0 —hash=sha256:

Every transitive dependency needs a hash too, and pip refuses the whole install if one line is missing one. Install with:

pip install --require-hashes --only-binary :all: -r requirements.txt

That all-or-nothing rule is the feature, and it is also why teams switch the mode off the first time a deadline bites. pip 26.2 added —no-require-hashes for local directories and VCS URLs. It is handy, and it is a small escape hatch worth remembering.

Terminal showing sha256 hash lines in a requirements file, with a notary stamp illustration beside it

Check the Attestation Before the Install

PyPI can tell you which Trusted Publisher uploaded a file. The pypi-attestations CLI downloads the wheel and its provenance from the Integrity API, checks that the publisher matches the repository you name, and verifies the signature. The docs give this example:

pypi-attestations verify pypi --repository https://github.com/pypa/sampleproject $WHEEL_DIRECT_URL

Swap in the source repository you actually expect. That flag is the whole check. If you copy the sample value from the docs, you have confirmed the file came from somewhere. You have not confirmed it came from the place you care about.

Pip does not run this check on its own. PyPI’s provenance docs name pip-plugin-pep740, a third-party plugin from Trail of Bits, as a tool that checks attestations before install. They also say native pip and uv support was proposed but is not in active development. So your install pipeline gets one more step, and that step is yours to maintain.

PyPI labels provenance problems too, with Incomplete, Inconsistent, Change of and Loss of warnings. The Change and Loss warnings fire only when a release’s provenance differs from a release made in the preceding 14 days. That is a sensible noise filter, and it has a consequence. A publishing path that changes after a quiet month may raise no warning at all. Check attestations on every version you pin, not only the ones that look new. Each attestation is also recorded in a public transparency log, according to PyPI’s blog, so you can later check what was uploaded, and when.

Read the Wheel Before Python Does

A wheel is a zip archive, so you can list its contents without installing anything:

python -m zipfile -l agent_framework-1.26.0-py3-none-any.whl
python -m zipfile -l agent_framework-1.26.2-py3-none-any.whl

Diff the two listings. A new top-level .pth file is the thing to stop on. The 1.26.1 wheel shipped agent_framework_meta.pth with one import line, and the 1.26.2 wheel shipped af_runtime_diag.pth. The names differ, but the mechanism is the same. That is the lesson. A grep for last week’s file names misses this week’s payload, while a check for the mechanism catches both. The 1.26.2 build also restored the package’s init.py to the clean 1.26.0 version, so a diff of the main module alone would have looked calm.

Then check the environment you actually installed into:

python -c 'import site; print(site.getsitepackages())'
grep -l '^import' /path/to/site-packages/*.pth

Expect a hit or two from legitimate packages. Each hit is a line to read, not an alarm.

Diagram of a Python interpreter startup with a configuration file running code before the main program

Python’s own docs make this check depend on the interpreter version. An import line in a .pth file runs at every interpreter start, whether or not anything imports the module. In Python 3.15 those lines are deprecated. They are silently ignored in 3.18 and 3.19, and a warning is planned for 3.20. From 3.15, a file with the same base name as the .pth and a .start extension can replace the import lines, so your grep needs a second pattern. Look for .start files beside each .pth. Record the interpreter version next to every audit, because the same line runs on anything before 3.15 and does nothing on 3.18. Silent ignoring is a blunt fix. It disarms the payload, and it also breaks any legitimate package that relied on the line, without a single error to point you at.

A Procedure for the Next Release

  1. Pin exact versions, and log when you resolved them. When an advisory lands, that timestamp tells you whether your lock file was exposed.
  2. Download the candidate with —only-binary :all: and —no-deps, then run pypi-attestations against the repository you expect.
  3. List the wheel and diff it against the last version you trusted. Stop on any new top-level .pth or .start file, and on any dependency you did not expect.
  4. Hash the vetted files, write the hashes into requirements.txt, and install with —require-hashes.
  5. After installing, re-run the site-packages check and watch outbound connections from build machines for hosts you never allowed.

If you already installed 1.26.1 or 1.26.2, the order changes. Wiz recommends pinning to 1.26.0 and searching lock files, CI logs, virtual environments and container images for the bad versions. Check site-packages for the persistence files, check egress for the webhook address, and rotate the secrets that environment could read. For workflows that installed 1.26.2 and hold id-token: write, Wiz says to treat them as exposed, including GitHub OIDC tokens. Managed-identity and OIDC-exchanged tokens can stay valid for up to 24 hours, so rotating a password does not close the door on a token that was already issued.

Where This Breaks

Most teams will not run this procedure on an ordinary Tuesday, and I don’t think that is a character flaw. Hash mode is all-or-nothing, so the first unhashed transitive dependency becomes a reason to switch it off. The attestation check is a separate tool that pip does not run. The 14-day warning window is relative. A wheel audit sees only what the wheel contains, so a payload that fetches code at runtime, or hides in a dependency you never listed, passes the file-list check cleanly.

The exfiltration in this incident went to a free webhook.site token. That service caps requests at 100 and expires them after seven days, and Wiz says 50 requests were captured and it found three unique cases of exfiltrated victim data. Somewhere a threat actor is working inside a free-tier quota, which is the most relatable detail in the whole report.

If I had to script one check first, it would be the attestation. It is the only one here that tells you who built the file, and it is the one most teams skip.

Fun Facts

  • Startup hooks run before your code: An import line in a .pth file executes when the interpreter starts, even if nothing ever imports the package. The Python site docs say so plainly.
  • Detaching on purpose: Wiz says the 1.26.1 payload forked a detached session with os.setsid(), or fell back to a daemon thread if that failed.
  • Thirty-three minutes: The second malicious release went up about 33 minutes after the first. BleepingComputer reads that as a sign the attacker still had publishing access after the first quarantine.
  • Credential sprawl: Wiz counts up to 300 /proc/*/environ files read per run, and the 1.26.2 build raised its credential-file ceiling from 60 to 80.

Sources